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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

RICHARD S. SWART,
Petitioner/Appellant,

Case No. 20000814-CA

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

Priority No. ?

Respondent/Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner appeals from an order denying his motion for relief from a judgment
denying his petition for post-conviction relief. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Did the district court properly deny petitioner's motion seeking relief from the

order dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief?
Standard of Review. A motion for relief from a judgment or order under rule 60(b),
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Franklin Covey Client
Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, f 9,2 P.3d 451; accord Ostler v. Buhler, 957 P.2d
205,206 (Utah 1998).

1

2.

Where this Court has already dismissed petitioner's appeal of an order denying

the petition for post-conviction relief, is petitioner's challenge to that order in this appeal
properly before the Court?
Standard of Review. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to hear a claim on appeal is
a question of law reviewed for correctness. See Blaine Hudson Printing v. Utah State Tax
Comm'n, 870 P.2d 291, 292 (Utah App. 1994) (holding that "whether jurisdiction exists
presents a question of law, which [the Court] review[s] for correctness").
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation of rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, is relevant to a
determination of this case. That rule provides:
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence;
fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the
judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or
a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated,
or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application;
or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3), not
more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an
independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding or to
set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any
relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an
independent action.

2

Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

On December 10, 1993, petitioner, with the advice of counsel, Brad Rich, entered
pleas of no contest to two counts of forcible sexual abuse, both second degree felonies, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404 (1990). R. 128-36; see also R. 137-68 (plea hearing
transcript). The pleas were made pursuant to a plea bargain in which one of the two counts
was reduced from a first degree felony to a second degree felony. R. 131,136. On January
24, 1994, sentenced petitioner to serve concurrent prison terms of one-to-fifteen years. R.
169-70; see also R. 171-96 (sentencing transcript). Nothing in the record suggests that
petitioner ever moved to withdraw his plea or otherwise appealed his sentence.1
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

Almost six months after sentencing, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus. See R. 972. The district court denied the petition and the court of appeals affirmed
the denial on appeal. See R. 972; Case No. 940621-CA. The Utah Supreme Court denied
the petition for a writ of certiorari. See R. 972; Case No. 950195-SC.

*Nearly eighteen months after sentencing, petitioner filed a pro se "Motion for
Orders to Expunge Records, Produce Records, and Complete a New Presentence
Investigation Report," claiming, in part, that he had received information that his attorney
had not fully investigated his case. R. 197-206. The trial court denied the motion. R.
207-08.

PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

Grounds for Relief. In September, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for relief under the
Post-Conviction Remedies Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to-110 (1996), and rule 65C,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 1-5. Petitioner alleged, among other things, that (1) his
trial counsel, Brad Rich, did not adequately investigate the case because he did not obtain
certain psychological records of the victim from Benchmark Regional Hospital, (2) petitioner
did not have enough information to make an informed plea, and (3) Rich coerced him into
accepting the plea bargain. R. 2, 18-22. After reviewing the petition, the sentencing judge
ordered the State to respond. R. 112.
Motions to Dismiss Petition. The State moved to dismiss the petition for failure to file
within the one-year statute of limitations period provided under Utah Code Ann. § 78-3 5a107(1996). R. 117,209-24. The district court agreed, dismissing the petition. R. 254,25762. Petitioner appealed and the court of appeals reversed, relying on State v. Frausto, 966
P.2d 849 (Utah 1998). R. 263, 357-60; Swart v. State, 1999 UT App 96, 976 P.2d 100.
In July, 1999, the State filed a second motion to dismiss the petition. R. 418-19. The
State argued that the petition was procedurally barred under Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-106
(1996). R. 424-33. The State argued that the petition should in any event be denied because
the record demonstrated a knowing and voluntary plea and petitioner failed to adequately
allege a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. R. 434-52.
Evidentiary Hearing and Ruling. On September 20th and 28th, 1999, the district court
held an evidentiary hearing on the merits of petitioner's post-conviction claims. R. 617-18,
4

621. Some three months later, after receiving written summations from both parties, the
district court issued a memorandum decision denying the petition. R. 632-99, 807-52; R.
853-61. On March 6, 2000, the district court signed and entered the order of dismissal,
which included findings of fact and conclusions of law. R. 971-83.2
Motion for Relief from Judgment. On May 1,2000, petitioner moved for relief from
judgment, claiming that Rich's testimony at the evidentiary hearing was perjured. See R.
1031-68; see also R. 1104-05. To support that claim, petitioner also sought to supplement
the record with the affidavit of Ray Singley—a therapist who had treated petitioner,
additional records from Benchmark Regional Hospital, and a copy of a bar complaint
petitioner had filed against Rich. R. 1031-68. In a minute entry, the district court granted
petitioner's motion to supplement the record, but denied his motion for relief from the order
of dismissal. R. 1111-12. On September 12,2000, the district court entered a written order
to that effect. R. 1432-33.3 The court explained that while Singley's affidavit raised "some
concern" regarding Rich's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, that testimony "was by no
means determinative in this case and indeed, played little or no part in the Court's decision."
R. 1111.

2

The district court rejected petitioner's subsequent objections to the order of
dismissal. R. 1010-11, 1020-27, 1457-58.
3

The minute entry and corresponding order are reproduced in Addendum A.
5

Appeals. On June 7,2000, petitioner filed a notice of appeal challenging the district
court's order of dismissal entered March 6, 2000. R. 1118.4 On September 19, 2000,
petitioner filed a second notice of appeal, now before this Court, challenging the district
court's order of dismissal and the "denial of his post-judgment motions, which were entered
on September 12, 2000." R. 1452-53, 1459. The State moved to dismiss both appeals as
untimely. SeeR. 1512-13, 1522-23.
Concluding that the first appeal challenging the order of dismissal was not timely
filed, this Court dismissed that appeal for lack of jurisdiction. R. 1522-23; Swart v. State,
2001 UT App 2 (reproduced in Addendum B). The Supreme Court denied petitioner's
petition for a writ of certiorari. See Swart v. State, Docket No. 20010209-SC (Utah June 20,
2001). This Court denied the State's motion to dismiss the second appeal, concluding that
"the appeal is timely insofar as it is taken from the denial of a motion under rule 60(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." R. 1513 (reproduced in Addendum C).5
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's motion for relief
from the order denying his petition for post-conviction relief. Petitioner claimed that his trial
counsel's testimony at the post-conviction hearing was perjured. However, petitioner offered

4

In his notice of appeal, petitioner alleged that the final order of dismissal was
entered on May 30, 2000, rather than March 6, 2000, the date it was signed and file
stamped. SeeR. 971-81.
Petitioner has since filed with the district court a "Motion for Setting Aside of
Court's Order Dismissing Petition for Extraordinary Relief on the Basis of Fraud and
Perjury." R. 1637-39. The district court has not addressed that motion.
6

no evidence to substantiate that claim. Moreover, whether or not counsel spoke with the
therapist was not a factor in the district court's denial of the petition for post-conviction
relief. Accordingly, petitioner is not entitled to relief under rule 60(b) even if the claim of
perjury were substantiated because that testimony was not a basis for the district court's
order.
Petitioner's challenge to the order denying post-conviction relief is not properly before
the Court. Petitioner's appeal of the denial was dismissed for failure to timely appeal.
Petitioner cannot now challenge the underlying merits of that denial in an appeal on a motion
for relief from judgment.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR RELIEF FROM THE ORDER
DISMISSING HIS PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
Petitioner seeks reversal of the district court's denial of his motion for relief from the
court's order denying post-conviction relief. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-22.6 Petitioner's motion
is treated as a motion under rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. R. 1513.7

6

The district court treated petitioner's "Motion to Supplement Record and for
Relief from Order/Judgment" as two separate motions: a "Motion to Supplement [the]
Record" and a "Motion for Relief from Ruling or Order [Denying Post-Conviction
Relief]." See R. 1432-33 (emphasis in original). Because the district court granted the
motion to supplement the record, petitioner only challenges the trial court's denial of his
motion for relief from the order denying post-conviction relief.
7

On the State's motion to dismiss the appeal as untimely, this Court ruled that "the
appeal is timely insofar as it is taken from the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) of the
7

Petitioner did not identify in his motion the grounds upon which he sought relief from
the order, but merely asked that the district court "reconsider and grant relief from the
dismissal "[t]o the extent that the record supplementation [so] persuades the Court." R.
1032; see also R. 1067. The gravamen of petitioner's rule 60(b) motion appears to be a claim
that petitioner's trial counsel gave perjured testimony at the post-conviction hearing. In
support of this allegation, petitioner submitted an affidavit by Ray Singley, a mental health
counselor who had provided counseling to petitioner before his conviction. See R. 1033-35.
In that affidavit, Singley stated that contrary to Rich's testimony at the evidentiary hearing,
he did not recall ever speaking with Rich concerning petitioner. R. 1034. The district court
acknowledged that the affidavit created "some concern to the Court," but denied the motion
for relief because "the testimony of Mr. Rich regarding his conversations with Mr. Singley
was by no means determinative in this case and indeed, played little or no part in the Court's
decision." R. 1111.8 Petitioner appeals that decision. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-22.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure." Order Denying Motion to Consolidate and to Dismiss
Second Appeal, Dec. 19, 2000 (R. 1513).
Petitioner has not challenged on appeal the trial court's conclusion that his bar
complaint against Mr. Rich and the victim's Benchmark records did not provide a basis
for relief from the order of dismissal. See Aplt. Brf. at 18-24. The bar complaint was
nothing more than a reiteration of petitioner's grievances against his trial counsel. See R.
1036-44. Moreover, and as noted by the district court, the records from Benchmark
Regional Hospital had previously been submitted to the court at the post-conviction
hearing. See R. 1111; compare R. 1045-65 with Plaintiffs Exhibits 13 and 15; see also
R. 65-72. Information already before the court provides no basis for relief under rule
60(b). See Murdock v. Springville Municipal Corp., 1999 UT 39, f 23, 982 P.2d 65
(holding that submission of information identical to that which has been previously
admitted does not constitute newly discovered evidence and thus provides no basis for a
rule 60(b) motion).
8

A. ESTABLISHING FRAUD UNDER RULE 60(B).

Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may in the
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Petitioner's claim of perjury raises a claim of intrinsic fraud. See St.
Pierre v. Edmonds, 645 P.2d 615, 618 (Utah 1982) (observing that "false testimony during
the trial" falls under the rubric of intrinsic fraud).9 To prevail on a claim of perjury, it is not
enough simply to show contradictions in trial testimony. See State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22,
24-25 (Utah 1984) (holding that "mere inconsistencies between the testimony of a witness
for the prosecution is not enough to constitute perjury"). "There must be some palpable
contradiction or untruth." Id. at 25.
Moreover, rule 60(b) permits relief only "in the furtherance ofjustice." Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b). Thus, a movant is not entitled to relief unless the alleged fraud had an adverse
impact on the proceedings. See Birch v. Birch, 111 P.2d 1114, 1117 (Utah App. 1989)
(finding that husband's claim for relief from a stipulated judgment dividing marital assets to
be without merit because his wife's alleged misrepresentations "would not have been a
legitimate factor in determining a division of the parties' property"); see also St. Pierre, 645

9

The distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud was once significant because
courts allowed relief from extrinsic fraud, but not intrinsic fraud. See St. Pierre, 645 P.2d
at 618. Utah now recognizes that relief may be obtained in either case. Id. at 618-19.
9

P.2d at 618 (holding that "[intrinsic fraud refers to matters occurring during the course of
the proceedings . . . which may have influenced the judgment1').
A review of the record reveals that the district court correctly denied petitioner's
motion for relief.
B.

PETITIONER FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE HIS CLAIM OF PERJURY.

Petitioner failed in the first instance to substantiate his allegation of perjury. At the
post-conviction hearing, Singley testified that he had "no memory" of Rich contacting him.
R. 1702: 77. On the other hand, Rich testified that he spoke with Singley on two or three
occasions. R. 1703:281; 310-11. According to Rich, Singley confirmed in those discussions
that petitioner was a pedophile and had admitted to pedophelic behavior with several
patients. R. 1703: 281. On cross-examination, Rich could not account for the difference in
their testimonies, but reaffirmed his testimony on direct, maintaining that he and Singley
"talked on multiple occasions." R. 1703:311.
In support of his claim that Rich's testimony was perjured, petitioner offered the
affidavit of Singley. That affidavit, however, fell short of substantiating petitioner's claim
of perjury. Singley simply reaffirmed his trial testimony. See R. 1034: ^f 5 (asserting that he
"did not recall ever having spoken to [petitioner's] attorney, Brad Rich . . . .") and ^ 6
(alleging that Rich's testimony was false). In an effort to bolster his credibility, Singley
added that a review of his telephone records found no evidence of a conversation with Rich.
R. 1034: \ 8. This is insufficient. Singley did not submit the telephone records, nor did he
identify what kinds of telephone records he kept, under what circumstances he kept telephone
10

records, or what information he included. Moreover, Singley's assertion that he "did a fairly
exhaustive review" of his telephone records suggests that it was not a complete review. See
R. 1034:18. In short, the affidavit upon which petitioner relied to establish perjury offered
no substantiation of that claim—the question remained a "he said, he said" proposition.10 As
provided under Utah's perjury laws, a false statement under oath "may not be established
solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single witness." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8505(1) (1999). Because petitioner failed to demonstrate that Rich made a false statement,
his was not entitled to relief from the judgment.
Petitioner contends on appeal that the district court erred in denying his motion for
relief because it failed to "conduct a threshold inquiry to determine whether perjury had in
fact been committed" as alleged in his motion. Aplt. Brf. at 18-19. He argues that this was
error because a finding of perjury would have necessarily entitled him to relief from the order
of dismissal. Aplt. Brf. at 20-22. However, petitioner did not request an evidentiary hearing,
but asked for relief based on the record supplementation only. See R. 1032, 1067. In fact,
petitioner filed a notice to submit the motion for decision ten days after filing the motion.
R. 1098. He cannot now complain on appeal that no hearing was held. See Lopez v. Shulsen,
10

Indeed, while Singley denied speaking with either Rich or his predecessor Ron
Yengich, R. 1702: 77-78, Yengich's notes suggested that he did speak with Singley. R.
1703: 223. Yengich testified that according to one note, Singley told Yengich that
petitioner likely "did it." R. 1703: 226. That note was apparently part of Plaintiff s
Exhibit 10, but the record inexplicably only includes one page of that exhibit.
Moreover, Rich's remarks at the sentencing hearing confirm his testimony at the
post-conviction hearing that he spoke with Singley. See Transcript of Sentencing (part of
record, but not indexed), p. 6 ("I have discussed this with his therapist on the west
coast-Ray Singley-at great length.").
11

716 P.2d 787, 789 (Utah 1986) (holding that "[f|amiliar rules of appellate review preclude
an issue being raised for the first time on appeal except under exceptional circumstances").
C.

THE ALLEGED PERJURED TESTIMONY WAS NOT A FACTOR IN THE DISTRICT
COURT'S DECISION.

Even assuming for argument's sake that Rich did not testify truthfully, petitioner's
claim still fails. As explained above, a movant is not entitled to relief from the judgment
unless the false testimony adversely affected the judgment. See Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b); Birch,
771 P.2d at 1117; St. Pierre, 645 P.2d at 618. In ruling on the petition for post-conviction
relief, the district court made "no finding as to whether [trial counsel's] conduct fell below
the required standard" for effective assistance of counsel. R. 855,979. The court thus held
that trial counsel's testimony regarding his investigation, and particularly "his conversations
with Mr. Singley[,] was by no means determinative." R. 1111. The district court instead
denied the petition for post-conviction relief because petitioner did "not establish[ ] that any
deficient performance prejudiced his defense." R. 979; see also R. 855-56. Accordingly,
petitioner's claim that his trial counsel falsely testified has no conceivable impact on the
judgment because the district court did not deny his petition based on counsel's performance,
but rather on the determination that any alleged deficiency in investigation did not prejudice
petitioner.11
11

As revealed at the post-conviction hearing, Rich and his predecessor in fact
conducted significant investigation. They obtained discovery from the prosecutor, R.
1703: 247, interviewed the victim, R. 1702: 164; R. 1703: 247, spoke at length with
petitioner, R. 1703: 248, spoke to other witnesses, including Dr. LaPray, R. 1703: 257,
obtained information about the victim from Psychological Associates, R. 1703: 258,
arranged for petitioner to view a photograph of the victim, R. 1703: 251-53, and, contrary
12

Moreover, the information provided by Singley was not useful to a defense. At the
post-conviction hearing, Singley testified he diagnosed petitioner in part with pedophelia.
R. 1702: 81, 84-86. He indicated that petitioner had related his involvement in at least one
inappropriate incident. R. 1702: 73, 87. He testified that he provided counseling to
petitioner for his pedophelia and other problems for almost three years leading up to
petitioner's incarceration. See R. 1702: 73, 84-86. Notwithstanding that therapy, Singley
testified that pedophelia was still part of his diagnosis for petitioner. R. 1702: 88. Although
Singley also expressed his belief that petitioner was not acting out his pedophelia and was
progressing in his therapy, R. 1702: 79, 89, those opinions would have done little to assist
the defense if introduced at a trial.
Finally, this information could have no conceivable impact on petitioner's decision
to enter the plea agreement. As the patient, he was well aware of his therapy with Singley.
See R. 1703: 209, 212-13. Accordingly, even assuming Rich had not spoken with Singley,
that would have had no effect on petitioner's decision to enter a plea. See Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370 (1985) (holding that "in order to satisfy the 'prejudice'
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to
trial").

to petitioner's claim, spoke with his therapist, R. 1703: 281-82.
13

II.
PETITIONER'S CHALLENGE TO THE DISTRICT COURT'S
UNDERLYING ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF IS NOT PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT
In his final claim, petitioner contends that his petition for post-conviction relief should
have been granted because his trial counsel suffered from a conflict of interest which
adversely affected petitioner's right to effective assistance of counsel. See Aplt. Brf. at 23.
That claim is a direct challenge to the district court's order denying the petition for postconviction relief. Because the appeal here is not an appeal from the district court's denial
of post-conviction relief, but rather from an order denying relief from the denial, review of
petitioner's claim is not subject to review by this Court.
Fifty-six days after the district court's denial of his petition for post-conviction relief,
petitioner filed a "Motion to Supplement Record and for Relief from Order/Judgment." R.
1031-32. Thirty-seven days later—93 days after the post-conviction denial, petitioner also
initiated appellate review of the post-conviction denial by filing a notice of appeal. See R.
971-83, 1118. While that appeal was still pending, the district court granted the motion to
supplement the record.

R. 1432. However, petitioner's motion for relief from the

order—which the district court treated as a rule 59 and 60(b) motion, was denied. R. 143233. The court explained that it was "not persuaded that the Record as supplemented justifies
the granting of his petitioner's post-judgment relief, or that its prior ruling denying postconviction relief should be altered or amended." R. 1433. One week later on September 19,
2000, petitioner filed another notice of appeal. R. 1452-53,1459. In that notice, petitioner
14

again purported to appeal the district court's order denying his petition for post-conviction
relief. R. 1452. He also appealed the district court's refusal to grant his motion seeking
relief from the order denying post-conviction relief. See R. 1452.12 Therefore, as of
September 19, 2000, this Court had before it two appeals arising from the same case.
In the first appeal, petitioner sought "reversal of the trial court's denial of his petition
for post-conviction relief." R. 1522; Swart v. State, 2001 UT App 2. However, the State
moved for summary dismissal for lack ofjurisdiction. R. 1522; Swart v. State, 2001 UT App
2. This Court agreed, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the appeal was filed more
than 30 days after the district court denied the petition for post-conviction relief. R. 1522;
Swart, 2001 UT App 2. The Court also held that petitioner had not filed any timely postjudgment motions that would otherwise extend the appeal period. R. 1522-22 A; Swart, 2001
UT App 2. Accordingly, petitioner's first appeal, which challenged the order dismissing the
petition for post-conviction relief, was dismissed. R. 1522A; Swart, 2001 UT App 2.
The State also moved to dismiss the second appeal, which is the appeal now before
this Court, on the ground that it too was untimely. See R. 1512. The Court observed that "an
order denying a Rule 60(b) motion is itself final and appealable." R. 1512. Because the
notice of appeal wasfiledjust seven days after the district court's order denying relief from
the judgment, the Court denied the State's motion to dismiss this second appeal "insofar as
12

The notice of appeal indicates that petitioner was appealing the "denial of his
post-judgment [sic] motions, which were entered on September 12, 2000." R. 1452. The
September 12th order of the district court granted petitioner's motion to supplement the
record, but denied petitioner's motion for relief from the order denying the petition for
post-conviction relief. SeeR. 1432-33.
15

it is taken from the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure." R. 1513. This Court later "reminded [petitioner] that this case, pursuant to the
court's order of December 19, 2000, is timely only insofar as it is taken from denial of a
motion under rule 60(b)." Order dated January 23, 2001 (reproduced in Addendum D).
As the foregoing proceedings make clear, the scope of this appeal is limited to the
district court's denial of petitioner's rule 60(b) motion for relief from the order denying the
post-conviction petition. Petitioner's final claim, seeking reversal of the district court's order
denying post-conviction relief, is thus beyond the scope of this appeal. Indeed, as this Court
has already held, the Court lacks jurisdiction to address any challenge to the district court's
order denying the petition for post-conviction relief. R. 1522-22A. The Court could not
then, and cannot now, take jurisdiction over an appeal "which is not timely brought before
i t " Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 (Utah 1982).
Moreover, rule 60(b) is not a mechanism to review the underlying merits of the order
from which relief is sought. As this Court recently held:
"An appeal of a Rule 60(b) order addresses only the propriety of the denial or
grant of relief. The appeal does not, at least in most cases, reach the merits of
the underlying judgment from which relief was sought. Appellate review of
Rule 60(b) orders must be narrowed in this manner lest Rule 60(b) become a
substitute for timely appeals. An inquiry into the merits of the underlying
judgment or order must be the subject of a direct appeal from that judgment or
order."
Franklin Covey Client Sales, Inc. v. Melvin, 2000 UT App 110, \ 19,2 P.3d 451 (quoting 12
James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice § 60.68[3] (3d ed. 1999)(emphasis in
original).
16

Relief from an order may be granted under rule 60(b) only for the following reasons:
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered
evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move
for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated
intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party;
(4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation
of the judgment.
Utah R. Civ. P. 60(b). Petitioner simply challenges the district court's denial of his petition,
claiming that it should have granted post-conviction relief because of an alleged conflict of
interest. Aplt. Brf. at 23. Such a challenge does not fall within one of the six enumerated
categories, even under that which permits relief for "mistake." Franklin Covey, 2000 UT
App 110, at f 22 (holding that "[i]f a court merely wrongly decided a point of law, that is not
[mistake], inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.") (internal quotes and citations
omitted).
Like the appellant in Franklin Covey, petitioner here "has attempted to use Rule 60(b)
as a 'back door' to a direct appeal of the underlying judgment[ ]" after having failed to timely
appeal that judgment. Id. at ^f 23. This he cannot do. Accordingly, this Court should reject
petitioner's attempt to present for review issues that would only have been properly before
the Court on a direct, timely appeal from the order denying post-conviction relief. See id. at
25.
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to affirm the
district court's order denying relief from the judgment.
Respectfully submitted this (Q day of November, 2001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

J E p R E Y S. GRAY
y
''ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the [ 3 day of November, 2001,1 served two copies of the
attached Brief of Appellee upon the petitioner/appellant, Richard S. Swart, by causing them
to be delivered via first class mail, postage prepaid, to him as follows:
Richard S. Swart
ProSe
P.O. Box 550
Gunnison, UT 84634

JefftJy'S. Gray
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD SWART,

MINUTE ENTRY
CASS NO.

Petitioner,

970906919

vs.
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

The Court has reviewed the Motion to Supplement the Record and
for Relief from Order and Judgment.
The Court grants the Motion to Supplement the Record and
denies the Motion for Relief from Order and Judgment.
At the time of the Court's decision, the Court had before it
the medical records referred to in the Motion to Supplement the
Record.
The filing of a Bar complaint

against Mr. Rich is not

something that would persuade the Court to change its decision.
The Affidavit of Ray Singley is, of course, of some concern to
the Court and may or may not be a key issue in the complaint before
the Bar, however, the testimony

of Mr. Rich

regarding his

conversations with Mr. Singley was by no means determinative in
this case and indeed, played little or no part in the Court's
decision.

001111

SWART V. STATE

PAGE TWO

MINUTE ENTRY

Counsel is to^prepare an appropriate Order.
Dated this

[

day of May, 2000.

<r^n

/

FRANK G. NOEL
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PAGE THREE

SWART V. STATE

MINUTE ENTRY

MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this | ^ V

day of May,

2000:

Mitchell R. Barker
Attorney for Petitioner
6550 Emerald, Suite 108
Boise, Idaho 83704
Erin Riley
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah
84114-0854

0 0111

FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District
Mitchell R. Barker
Utah Bar # 4530
Idaho #6033
Attorney for Petitioner
6550 West Emerald, #108
Boise, Idaho 83704
Telephone (208) 375-9392

SEP t 2 2000
£v

»_££

SALT LM(E C0UNTy

u

Deputy Clerk

T H I R D DISTRICT C O U R T IN AND F O R SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE O F UTAH
RICHARD S. SWART,
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH,

ORDER GRANTING
MOTION TO
SUPPLEMENT RECORD
AND DENYING POSTJUDGMENT MOTION
FOR RELIEF FROM
ORDER OR JUDGMENT
Civil No. 970906919RN

Respondent.

Comes before the Court the motion of Petitioner Richard Swart to supplement the trial record
in this matter, as amended, along with his motion for relief from the Ruling of dismissal of the Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief in this matter.
The motion was filed with the Court on May 1, 2000, and was supplemented on May 4,
2000. It having been fully briefed, the Court entered its Minute Entry on May 19, 2000, ruling upon
both motions. The Court having considered the memoranda of the parties, and good cause appearing,
it is hereby
ORDERED as follows:
1.

Petitioner's Motion to Supplement Record is granted.

2.

The Court is not persuaded that the Record as supplemented justifies the granting of
his petitioner's post-judgment motion for relief, or that its prior Ruling denying postconviction relief should be altered or amended.

Accordingly, Petitioner's Motion for Relief from Ruling or Order, which is deemed to be
under both Rule 60(b) URCP and 59 URCP, is denied.
SO ORDERED this / t ? - d a y of September, 2000.
BYTHEC(

Honorable Fr;
Presiding Judgi

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On the 4th day of September, 2000,1 mailed a copy of the foregoing, by postage prepaid mail, to:
Erin Riley, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
P.O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

Mitchell R. Barker

September 4, 2000

Honorable Frank Noel
Presiding Judge
Third District Court
P.O. Box 1860
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Re: Richard Swart v. State of Utah
Habeas Corpus, Case #970906919
(Appeal # 20000511-CA)

Dear Judge Noel:
In the case of Richard Swart, which is on appeal, a review of the Docket in this
Court reveals two items which I appear to have overlooked. They are as follows:
1.

2.

It appears that, despite my recent letter to you, I have failed to date to
issue a Notice to Submit for Decision on my motion that the government
be required to pay for transcripts of the September 1999 trial in this
matter. That Notice to Submit is filed on this date, so that motion can be
wrapped up.
Of even more importance is that I apparently never submitted until now a
proposed Order on your ruling granting my April 28th motion to
supplement the record and for relieffromthe judgment. You granted the
first and denied the second parts of that motion, and I was to prepare the
order. I apologize for not having done so. Since the State is trying hard to
achieve dismissal of the appeal based on the claim that you did not have

6550 E M E R A H P H O T &W§ F© N O i l o 1 s E , I D 8 3 7 0 4
NAMPA/CALDWELL

467/9392

P H O N E 208/375/9392

O N T A R I O 881/8809

PAYETTE 642/9290

FAX 208/37W2403
MT

T O L L F R E E 80*0 ' 4 1 2 / 4 6 ^ ;

H O M E 387/2388

MLC\LL

6^4/4410

authority to extend our appeal time as you recently were kind enough to
do, this Order coming now is important.
Enclosed, therefore, is a proposed order. I am simultaneously sending a copy to
Erin Riley of the attorney general's office. Please wait eight days to allow
objection pursuant to the UCJA, and then sign it if it appears appropriate. An
extra copy and self addressed envelope are enclosed. I would appreciate Pat
conforming a copy of the order and sending it back to me. If there are errors or
corrections, please let me know.
Thank you for your assistance in this important step.

Copy: R. Swart, Erin Riley, Esq.
Enclosure

Honorable F. Noel
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Richard S. Swart,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.
State of Utah,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not For O f f i c i a l P u b l i c a t i o n )
Case No. 200.00511-CA
P I L E D
(January 5, 2001)

Respondent and Appellee.

2001 UT App 2

^Ho^OM/ef
Third District, Salt Lake Division
The Honorable Frank G. Noel
Attorneys:

Richard S. Swart, Draper, Appellant Pro Se
Jan Graham, Erin Riley, and Laura DuPaix, Salt Lake
City, for Appellee

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thome.
PER CURIAM:
The State moved for summary disposition of this appeal on
the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction because
petitioner's notice of appeal was not timely filed. Petitioner
seeks summary reversal of the trial court's denial of his
petition for post-conviction relief.
Rule 4(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides
that a notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days of entry of
the judgment or order appealed from which the appeal is taken.
The trial court's order dismissing petitioner's request for postconviction relief was entered on March 6, 2000. His notice of
appeal was filed on June 7, 2000. When a notice of appeal is
filed beyond the 30 days allowed by Utah Rule of Appellate
Procedure 4(a), this court does not have jurisdiction to consider
an appeal. See, e.g.. Glezos v. Frontier Inv., 896 P.2d 1230
(Utah Ct. App. 1995), State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 37 (Utah
1981). This rule applies whether or not an appellant has
received notice that a final order has been entered. Utah R. Civ.
P. 58A(c) and (d).
Petitioner suggests that the time for filing his appeal was
tolled by both his filing of objections to the trial court's
findings, conclusions and order and the trial court's grant of
his motion for extension of time to file his appeal. We note

that the objections were not filed within 10 days of the trial
court's order, as required by Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b)
and 59(b), Untimely post-judgment motions do not toll the time
for appeal. See, e.g., Burgers v. Maiben. 652 P.2d 1320, 1321
(Utah 1982) (per curiam); Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 130, 133
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). Additionally, petitioner made his motion
for extension of time to file the appeal beyond the time allowed
for such motions by rule 4(e). Since the motion was untimely,
the trial court did not have power to extend the time for filing.
Accordingly, it is hereby ordered that the appeal is
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Because we dismiss the case,
we do not consider the merits of other pending motions in this
appeal.

^Pamela9T

-

^

Famela T. Greenwood,Greenwood,Presidin Judge

K>
^

**~r

William

Thome, Jr,
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January, 2001, a true and
correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION was deposited in
the United States mail to:
RICHARD S. SWART
PO BOX 250
DRAPER UT 84020
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION
was hand-delivered to a personal representative of the Attorney
General's Office to be delivered to:
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
ERIN RILEY and LAURA DUPAIX
ASSISTANT ATTORNEYS GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
and a true and correct copy of the attached MEMORANDUM DECISION
was deposited in the United States mail to the judge listed
below:
HONORABLE FRANK G. NOEL
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE
450 S STATE ST
PO BOX 1860
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860

Judicial Secretary
TRIAL COURT: THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE, 970906919
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20000511-CA
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Richard S. Swart,
Petitioner and Appellant,
v.

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO
CONSOLIDATE AND TO DISMISS
SECOND APPEAL

State of Utah,
Respondent and Appellee.

Case No. 20000511-CA
Case No. 2000814-CA

These cases are before the court on appellant Richard
Swart!s motion to consolidate appeals, which is opposed by the
State, and on the State1s motion to dismiss the appeal in Case
No. 20000814-CA.
The appeal in Case No. 20000511-CA was taken from the
March 6, 2000 order dismissing Swartfs petition for postconviction relief. On May 1, 2000, Swart filed a Motion to
Supplement Record and for Relief from Judgment. On June 7,
2000, he filed a notice of appeal from the order dismissing the
petition. In an order entered on September 12, 2000, the
district court granted the motion to supplement, but denied the
motion for relief from judgment, which it "deemed to be under
both Rule 60(b) URCP and 59 URCP." Swart filed a notice of
appeal from this order on September 19, 2000.
The State contends that the motion for relief from
judgment was untimely under either Rule 59 or Rule 52 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and cannot extend the time for
appeal from the order dismissing the post-conviction petition.
This is precisely the issue before the court in the separate
motion to dismiss pending in Case No. 20000511-CA. In
contrast, the "second" appeal in Case No. 20000814-CA was
timely filed within thirty days after entry of the order
denying the motion for relief from judgment. In its motion to
dismiss the second appeal, the State fails to acknowledge that
an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion is itself final and
appealable. See, e.g.. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Schettler, 768
P.2d 950, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Based upon the foregoing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to consolidate the
appeals is denied, and

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the motion to dismiss the appeal
in Case No. 2000814-CA is denied because the appeal is timely
insofar as it is taken from the denial of a motion under Rule
60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. This order shall
have no effect on the pending motion to dismiss the appeal in
Case No. 20000511-CA.
Dated this /gx^-day of December, 2000.
FOR THE COURT:

Pamela T. Greenwood,
Presiding Judge

20000814-CA
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on December 20, 2000, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
RICHARD S. SWART ASPEN 104-T 22728
CENTRAL UTAH CORRECTIONAL
PO 550
GUNNISON UT 84634
J. FREDERIC VOROS, JR.
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
Dated this December 20, 2000.

By W/^4 S
Deputy Clerg)

-}/fr.jfc£„?
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Case No. 20000814-CA

0«,

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on December 20, 2000, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States
mail to the parties listed below:
ERIN RILEY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
160 E 300 S 6TH FL
PO BOX 140854
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854
MITCHELL R. BARKER
ATTORNEY AT LAW
6550 EMERALD #108
BOISE ID 83704
Dated this December 20, 2000.

By ^ckfr££<
Deputy Cle
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ORDER
Respondent and Appellee,
Case No. 20000814-CA
v.
Richard S. Swart,
Petitioner and Appellant.

This matter is before the court upon appellant's motion,
filed January 12, 2001, for enlargement of time to file summary
disposition motion, or in the alternative, to incorporate the
summary disposition motion filed in Case 20000511 as having been
filed in this case.
Appellant is advised that case no. 20000511-CA was dismissed
by memorandum decision issued on January 5, 2001. Further,
appellant is reminded that this case, pursuant to the court's
order of December 19, 2000, is timely only insofar as it is taken
from denial of a motion under Rule 60 (b) .
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that appellant is granted an extension
of time of thirty (30) days from the date of this order to file a
motion for summary disposition in this case. FURTHER, IT IS
ORDERED that appellant's alternative request for this court to
consider the motion for summary disposition filed in case no.
20000511-CA as also being filed in this case is denied.
Dated this 2 3 day of January, 2001.
FOR THE COURT:

William A. Thorne, Jr

